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The Integration of Smaller
Economies into the FTAA
FrankJ Garcia*
I. Introduction.
Trade has always been about inequality among states. On the one hand, the theory of
comparative advantage suggests that inequality in resource distribution is the sine qua
non of trade in that it offers trading states the key opportunity to specialize.' There is a
more troubling aspect, however, to the relationship between trade and inequality, in that
richer and more highly-developed states are presented with numerous opportunities for
outright predation and conquest,2 as well as for the pursuit of other inherently self-serv-
ing policies such as mercantilism, 3 in their trade relations with the less-developed world.
* Associate Professor, Florida State University College of Law. The author would like to thank
Professor Joseph Norton for the invitation to speak at the symposium. The author also thanks
symposium participants for their helpful comments and questions. The author would like to
acknowledge the able research assistance of Ani Majuni and Sandra Upegui. Research for this
article was supported by a grant from the Florida State University College of Law.
1. See DAVID RICARDO, PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY AND TAXATION 93 (1891) (explaining that
the operation of comparative advantage depends on efficient use of "the peculiar powers
bestowed by nature" on a particular state) (emphasis supplied); see also PAUL A. SAMUELSON,
ECONOMICS 668 (1973) (noting that the starting point for comparative advantage is diversity in
conditions of production between different countries).
2. In his seminal work, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, Adam
Smith writes:
Folly and injustice seem to have been the principles which presided over and
directed the first project of establishing [the American] colonies; the folly of
hunting after gold and silver mines, and the injustice of coveting the possession of
a country whose harmless natives, far from having ever injured the people of
Europe, had received the first adventurers with every mark of kindness and hospi-
tality.... [I]t was not the wisdom and policy, but the disorder and injustice of the
European governments which peopled and cultivated America.
ADAM SMITH, AN INQUIRY INTO THE NATURE AND CAUSES OF THE WEALTH OF NATIONS 350-51
(Kathryn Sutherland ed., 1993).
3. See id. at 351-52.
When [the North and South American colonies] were effectuated, and had
become so considerable as to attract the attention of the mother country, the first
regulations which she made with regard to them had always in view to secure to
herself the monopoly of their commerce; to confine their market, and to enlarge
her own at their expense, and, consequently, rather to damp and discourage, than
to quicken and forward the course of their prosperity.
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In this century, largely as a result of post-war decolonization, 4 the role of inequality
in economic relations has become a focus of international economic law.5 Confronted
since the early days of decolonization with increasingly unacceptable terms of trade for
their primary product exports6 and high tariff barriers to their manufactured goods, 7
developing countries were presented in the immediate post-war period with the problem-
atic option of working through systems such as the GATT,8 whose rules were largely writ-
ten by the advanced industrialized countries,9 or of attempting to develop other effective
economic fora for their concerns. Despite their initial attempts to influence world trade
rules through the Havana Charter negotiations, frustration with the resulting GATT sys-
tem, its domination by industrialized countries and slow rate of change, led many devel-
oping countries to minimize their involvement in the GATT and embark upon large-scale
multilateral attempts at systemic reform through institutions such as the U.N. Conference
on Trade and Development, 10 under the umbrella concept of a New International
4. See Kele Onyejekwe, International Law of Trade Preferences: Emanations from the European Union
and the United States, 26 ST. MARY'S L.J. 425, 429 (1995) ("As developing countries emerged from
colonialism, they called for a new world economic order, complaining that the international eco-
nomic order had effectively undermined their development efforts').
5. See generally id. (surveying the history of the international economic law of development, built
around the concept of trade preferences); see also Robert E. Hudec, GATT and the Developing
Countries, 1992 COLUM. Bus. L. REv. 67 (1992).
6. See JOHN MADELEY, TRADE AND THE POOR 34 (1992) (real prices for major commodity exports
have fallen steadily since 1960, with an acceleration in the rate of decline in the 1980s).
7. See id. at 57 (citing relatively higher tariffs against developing country manufactured goods).
8. General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade, Oct. 30, 1947, 61 Stat. A-11, T.I.A.S. 1700, 55 U.N.T.S.
194 [hereinafter GATT];
[M]ost of the developing countries joined the GATT at a time in their history when
they were largely suspicious of being integrated into the world economy. Most of
them saw liberalization, and the subsequent opening up of their economies to capi-
tal and goods from the developed world, as a move that would heighten the
inequalities that already existed in their international economic relations.
Kofi Oteng Kofuor, From GATT to the WTO: The Developing Countries and the Reform of the
Procedures for the Settlement of International Trade Disputes, 31 J. WORLD TRADE 117, 120 (1997).
9. See, e.g., Ndiva Kofele-Kale, The Principle of Preferential Treatment in the Law of GATT: Toward
Achieving the Objective of an Equitable World Trade System, 18 CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 291, 294-95
(1987-88) ("For the last four decades GATT has provided the legal framework within which most
international trade between [developing countries] and [industrialized countries] has occurred.
.Throughout this period [developing countries] have consistently voiced their disaffection with
the GATT system of world trade. This perception of GATT as being unresponsive to the eco-
nomic needs of [developing countries] is symptomatic of a more general dissatisfaction with tra-
ditional international law which the [developing countries] view as the normative product of
Eurocentric civilization and which, for most of its existence, has served as the 'white man's law'
and not as the Law of Nations." (footnotes omitted)).
10. See JOHN H. JACKSON, THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM 275 (1989) (noting that "a number of devel-
oping countries, dismayed with rules that had evolved [at the Havana conference], opted to stay
out of the GATT system for years."); see also Onyejekwe, supra note 4, at 446 ("Developing coun-
tries, frustrated with the gradualism of the GATT, looked elsewhere for progress. They turned to
the UNCTAD"). Developing countries continued to maintain some pressure in GATT for
increased recognition of their needs, centered around the principle of special and differential
treatment. See Hudec, supra note 5.
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Economic Order (NIEO). 11 Attempts to restructure large-small economy trade relation-
ships through framework treaties or initiatives taken as part of the NIEO, however, have
been largely ineffective in addressing developing country concerns. 12 As a result, develop-
ing countries have again shifted their focus away from the U.N. system and towards the
GATT/WTO system 13 with some success. 14 Nevertheless, smaller economies continue to
be particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of free trade. 15
This article will examine the problem of inequality as it relates to the integration of the
so-called "small economies" of the western hemisphere16 into an eventual Free Trade Area of
the Americas (FTAA). 17 In particular, this article will focus on the proposals developed by the
11. The New International Economic Order (NIEO), was a movement among developing countries
within the United Nations to force a shift in international economic relations away from struc-
turally disadvantageous policies towards a more equitable relationship between developed and
developing countries. See Declaration on the Establishment of a New International Economic
Order, G.A. Res. 3201, U.N. GAOR, 6th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 3, U.N. Doc. A/9559 (1974), reprint-
ed in 13 I.L.M. 715; see generally IGNAZ SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, INTERNATIONAL EcoNOMIc LAW 3-9
(1992); Bartram S. Brown, Developing Countries in the International Trade Order, 14 N. ILL. U. L.
REV. 347 (1994).
12. Despite the adoption of the founding resolution and the Charter of Economic Rights and Duties of
States, G.A. Res. 3281, U.N. GAOR, 7th Sess., Supp. No. 1, at 50, U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1975), the
movement and its parent organization, the UNCTAD, have been widely acknowledged as a fail-
ure. Madeley notes that "[tlhe story of UNCTAD between 1964 and 1992 has been captioned by
its initials:' which also stand for "until the next conference try and delay" or "under no circum-
stances take any decisions:' MADELEY, supra note 6, at 146. "Both sum up this trade and develop-
ment organization sadly, but brilliantly." See also SEIDL-HOHENVELDERN, supra note 11, at 9 (not-
ing that the NIEO cannot yet be said to be part of international economic law).
13. Along with this shift [towards open economies], developing countries have taken another step
toward what developed countries have long demanded: active participation in trade negotiations
in the [GATT]. Trade reforms have heightened the need for market access in a new range of prod-
ucts and increased their stakes in the system. To further these interests, developing countries have
committed themselves, both individually and as members of coalitions, to the round of negotia-
tions that began in Punta del Este in 1986, the Uruguay.Round.
THE DEVELOPING COUNTRIES IN WORLD TRADE 2 (Diana Tussie & David Glover eds., 1993).
14. While the Uruguay Round has been criticized as inadequate or even regressive for developing
countries, (see, e.g., Michael Rom, Some Early Reflections on the Uruguay Round Agreement as
Seen from the Viewpoint of a Developing Country, 28 J. WORLD TRADE 5 (1994)), particular aspects
of the WTO agreements, such as institutional reform and agreements in sectors such as agricul-
ture, which are important to developing countries, suggest a more favorable prognosis. See
Kofuor, supra note 8; see Note, Developing Countries and Multilateral Trade Agreements: Law and
the Promise of Development, 108 HARv. L. REV. 1715 (1995).
15. See infra notes 24-31 and accompanying text.
16. See infra notes 21-23 and accompanying text.
17. The FTAA is the centerpiece of the hemispheric agenda announced at the Miami Summit of the
Americas. See generally Andres Oppenheimer & Christopher Marquis, Free Trade Giant Set in
Motion, MIAMI HERALD, Dec. 11, 1994, at 34A; John M. Goshko & Peter Behr, Western Hemisphere
Leaders Agree to Form Free Trade Zone, WASH. POST, Dec. 11, 1994, at AI; David E. Sanger, Chile is
Admitted as North American Free Trade Partner, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 12, 1994, at A8. The signal
accomplishment of the Miami Summit of the Americas in December of 1994 was the signing of
the Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action by all thirty-four of the Summit participants. See
Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, 34 I.L.M. 808, 811 (1995) <http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/EnglishVersion/miami-e.htm>. The Declaration contains four areas in which principles
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Working Group on Smaller Economies (Working Group), one of a series of working groups
established to define and develop the work program of the Summit negotiations. 18 Since the
Summit countries have initiated the negotiation phase of the FTAA at the Santiago Summit, 19
and the Working Group has concluded its work,20 it is time to begin to assess the achieve-
ments of the Working Group in view of its mandate, and to analyze what lies ahead for the
integration of smaller economies in the FTAA. While the Working Group has set out several
useful proposals facilitating effective participation by the hemisphere's smaller economies, the
early and tentative stage of the FTAA negotiations has necessitated the postponement of more
are enunciated and broad objectives identified: making democracy more effective and more
widely participatory; promoting development primarily through free trade and investment and
only secondarily through public aid; working at the margins on certain poverty and discrimina-
tion problems; and broadening hemispheric consensus regarding sustainable development prin-
ciples in areas such as energy use and biodiversity. See id. The Plan of Action subdivides this into
twenty-three subsidiary agendas, which include items ranging from specific commitments to rat-
ify existing international instruments, to more general commitments that enact, for example,
domestic policies in certain areas, to rather vague commitments to "support or strengthen" cer-
tain issues or systems of hemispheric concern. See id. Nevertheless, the centerpiece of this agenda
is undeniably trade, an emphasis that has been viewed in different lights by commentators. See,
e.g., Stephen Lande & Nellis Crigler, Consensus in the Americas: Free Trade by 2005, Bus. MEXICO,
Jan.-Feb. 1995 ("Hemispheric leaders succeeded in ensuring a meaningful Summit of the
Americas by making trade the centerpiece of the historic December meeting"); but see Summit of
the Americas Questioned by Critics for 'Over-emphasis' on Free Trade, NoTISUR-LATIN AM. POL.
AFF., Dec. 16, 1994, available in 1994 WL 2244236 (Summit countries criticized for emphasis on
free trade over other pressing issues facing the hemisphere and raised in the Summit documents).
The Summit countries pledged "to begin immediately to construct the Free Trade Area of the
Americas, in which barriers to trade and investment will be progressively eliminated,' with nego-
tiations to conclude "no later than 2005;' and "concrete progress toward the attainment of this
objective.., by the end of this century." Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, supra, at 811.
18. The Miami Declaration and Plan of Action envisioned a series of follow-up ministerials among
the Summit countries, the first of which occurred in Denver in June, 1995. At the Denver
Ministerial the Trade Ministers received preliminary reports on the status of the work being per-
formed by the OAS and by the various trade and investment fora concerning current economic
integration arrangements and established seven working groups to begin reviewing specific
issues to be resolved in negotiating the FTAA. See Trade Ministers' Conference Reinforces
Commitment to Construct Hemispheric Free Trade Zone, CHRON. oF LATIN AM. ECON. AFF., July 6,
1995, at 1, available in 1995 WL 2297474. These working groups cover market access, customs
and rules of origin, investments, standards, sanitary measures, dumping and subsidies, and the
effects of integration on smaller economies. See id. The groups were charged with developing
actual proposals for FTAA negotiations in each of these areas and with presenting these proposals
at the Cartagena Ministerial. See Officials Urge Work Groups to Name Areas for First FTAA Results,
INSIDE NAFTA, Dec. 27, 1995, at 1, 19-91.
19. See Second Summit of the Americas, Santiago Declaration, (April 19, 1998) <http://www.ftaa-
alca.org/EnglishVersion/chilee.htm>.
20. Pursuant to the plan adopted in San Jose by hemispheric trade ministers, as endorsed by the
Summit countries in the Santiago Summit, initiation of the FTAA negotiations involved a transi-
tion from a working group model to a negotiating group model. See Ministerial Declaration of
San Jose, Fourth Trade Ministerial Meeting, San Jose, Costa Rica, Mar. 19, 1998 [hereinafter Costa
Rican Ministerial Declaration], reprinted in Americas Trade-Special Report, Mar. 23, 1998, at 6-8,
<http://www.ftaa-alca.org/EnglishVersion/costae.htm>.
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substantive, controversial proposals until later in the process. Thus, the current prognosis for
the success of smaller economies in the FTAA can only be one of guarded optimism.
II. The Problem of Inequality.
While inequalities among trading partners can be of many different sorts with differ-
ent implications for their economic relationships, one way to begin analyzing the prob-
lem is to look at inequalities in "size."2 1 When considered from a variety of perspectives,
most of the world's countries are small. 22 The smallness of states entails a variety of polit-
ical and economic consequences for the global order. From the point of view of trade, the
most important form of "smallness" is economic. In other words, trade is concerned with
small economies, 23 both the consequences of economic smallness for trade relations gen-
erally, and economic integration in particular.
A. ASYMMETRY AND ADJUSTMENT: TRADE PROBLEMS FACING SMALLER ECONOMIES.
Smaller economies share certain characteristics that make their participation in the inter-
national trading system riskier and more problematic. The Working Group's progress report
on the integration of smaller economies lists a variety of economic factors, which together
describe the special conditions affecting smaller economies as they participate in the global
trading system. 24 These factors are: small size of population and territory; small size of GDP
and GDP per capita; high dependence on external trade; high level of imports; high degree of
vulnerability to fluctuation in world prices and demand for their exports; high dependence on
21. "A unique definition or concept of a small country does not exist." ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN
STATES TRADE UNIT, OBSERVATIONS ON SMALL ECONOMIES AND WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC
INTEGRATION 1 (1995) [hereinafter OAS Report on Small Economies]. Countries are classified
according to a variety of categories by various international organizations for various purposes,
with typical classifications focusing on per capita income levels, indicators of development status,
and some set of indicators grouped according to the rubric "size." See id. Although development
status, itself a controversial measurement, may be more common or familiar, size is the concept
adopted by the Working Group in its deliberations, and so this article will follow that approach.
While there is no necessary correlation between size, however measured, and levels of development,
it can be said that many developing and least-developed countries exhibit the characteristics of a
small economy and that small size is an additional complicating factor affecting a country's growth,
policy options and development potential. Overcoming Obstacles and Maximizing Opportunities: A
Report by the Independent Group of Experts on Smaller Economies and Western Hemispheric
Integration, Mar. 1998, at 2; see Richard L. Bernal, The Integration of Small Economies in the Free
Trade Area of the Americas, CSIS Policy Papers on the Americas, vol. IX, no. 1, 6-10 (1998).
22. Looking at population alone, eighty-seven of the world's 193 states have a population of less than
5 million, fifty-eight under 2.5 million, and thirty-five less than 500,000 inhabitants. See Bernal,
supra note 21, at 1 (citing Small but Perfectly Formed, ECONOMIST, Jan. 3, 1998, at 65).
23. A wide variety of indicators, both quantitative and qualitative, have been employed in the
attempt to define a small economy. Leading indicators are population, GNP or GDP, per capita
income, land area, or some combination of factors. Id. at 2-8; see generally International
Economic Assn., ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES OF THE SIZE OF NATIONS (E.A.G. ROBINSON ed., 1960).
24. Report of the Working Group on Smaller Economies to the Vice Ministers, Rio de Janeiro, April 14-
17, 1997, reprinted in 4 AMERICAS TRADE, May 1, 1997, at 18, pt. I, § 2 [hereinafter Interim Report
on Smaller Economies].
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trade taxes for government revenues; limited human resources and technical expertise; high
unit costs for infrastructure and public administration; relatively undiversified economic base;
small size of domestic markets; heavy reliance on primary commodities; extreme vulnerability
to external shocks; and vulnerability to natural disasters. 25
Central to these risks is the fact that smaller economies are generally more open, i.e.,
external transactions are large in relation to the total economic activity. Smaller
economies rely more heavily on external trade than larger economies in order to compen-
sate for problems of scale, such as a narrow range of national resources and the absence of
certain types of production owing to the small size of the market.26 A high degree of
openness by itself is not a negative factor; however, when one considers this openness in
connection with other factors common to smaller economies, such as a relatively undi-
versified economic base, a heavy reliance on primary product exports, and a public rev-
enue system geared towards trade taxes, one can see the acute vulnerability of smaller
economies to fluctuations in world prices for their principal exports and imports.
This particular vulnerability is part of a larger dynamic at work in the political economy of
integration among unequal partners, described by Drache as the problems of asymmetry and
adjustment 27 The fundamental asymmetry in economic and other forms of power between
large and small states leads to the distortion of trade flows, as the dominant partner succeeds in
exporting more high-end goods to the smaller economies, and the smaller economy specializes
further in resource extraction and sub-assembly work.28 The adjustment burdens of restructur-
ing numerous industrial sectors with varying degrees of competitiveness and over-employment,
a difficult challenge in any trading system, 29 is particularly acute for the smaller economies,
whose industries are generally not competitive. Those industries that survive do so with outside
investment and technology and significant downsizing, leading to tremendous social pressures
on domestic governments. 30 Overall, there is the real risk that the distribution of benefits and
burdens within the integration system will be skewed in favor of the dominant party.3 1
25. Id.
26. In this hemisphere three of the largest countries in terms of territory (United States, Argentina,
Brazil) are the least trade-dependent, and the largest in terms of territory, Canada, is one of the
least open. In contrast, the Caribbean and Central American states are almost uniformly high in
terms of trade openness. Bernal, supra note 21, at 5.
27. Daniel Drache, Triple 'A' Trade: Asymmetry, Access and Adjustment, the Inflexible Limits of Trade
Blocs, in ECONOMIC INTEGRATION BETWEEN UNEQUAL PARTNERS 171 (Theodore Georgakopoulos et
al. eds., 1994). Drache also discusses a third factor, increased market access, which he considers
misleading insofar as it promises increased employment. Id. at 176. Since this problem is not
unique to integration with smaller economies, it is not discussed further in this article.
28. Id. at 176.
29. Id. at 175.
30. Id. at 178-79. One result is that smaller economies are forced to alter their wage and price struc-
tures to match the interests of the dominant partners. Trade systems are at the forefront of efforts
to substitute an efficiency-oriented, high employment model for the social welfare-oriented, full
employment model, which has often guided the domestic policy of smaller and developing
economies. Id. at 178-80. Without some sort of compensating regulatory and redistributive
mechanism, trade systems cannot deliver on their promise of increased employment, less expen-
sive goods and higher standards of well-being. Id. at 183.
31. Id. at 174. See also Frank J. Garcia, NAFTA and the Creation of the FTAA: A Critique of Piecemeal
Accession, 35 VA. J. INT'L L. 539 (1995) (analyzing trade and investment distorting effects of cer-
tain integration patterns among unequal partners).
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B. INEQUALITY AND TRADE LAW: RESPONDING TO ASYMMETRY
AND ADJUSTMENT PROBLEMS.
The primary legal and policy techniques utilized to address smaller economy con-
cerns in trade and integration are the principle of special and differential treatment and
the provision of financial and technical assistance. Together these techniques can be
understood as a partial response to the challenges of asymmetry and adjustment out-
lined above.
1. Special and differential treatment.
The principle of "special and differential treatment" has been a cornerstone of trade
between unequal partners since the late 1940s, when developing countries began pressing
their case for more favorable trade rules.32 The principle of special and differential treat-
ment recognizes that while the prosperity and development of smaller economies
depends ultimately on trade openness, smaller economy industries are uniquely vulnera-
ble to competition from older, more established and technologically advanced developed
country industries. 33 Therefore, it has been recognized that in appropriate cases certain
exceptions to trade liberalization rules, such as reciprocity of tariff obligations, could play
an important role in responding to these asymmetry problems by eliminating trade barri-
ers to smaller economy manufactured exports while retaining some protection for the
domestic market.
Under the concept of special and differential treatment, developing countries bene-
fit from two broad categories of measures: those providing special protection for devel-
oping country markets and those providing preferential access to developed country
markets for developing country exports. Market protection mechanisms available in
multilateral3 4 and regional 35 trade agreements include non-reciprocity of tariff obliga-
32. SeegenerallyloHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF GATT ch. 25 (1969); Kofele-Kale,
supra note 9.
33. Unrestricted competition in an unprotected developing country market would have severe effects
on developing country employment and industrialization, ultimately working to the disadvan-
tage even of export-oriented developed country industries, which need new markets for high-
end consumer goods and capital goods.
34. In terms of the GATT, the principle is found primarily in Article XVIII and in Part IV. GATT,
supra note 8. The WTO agreements as a whole (Final Act Embodying the Results of the Uruguay
Round of Trade Negotiations, Apr. 15, 1994, LEGAL INSTRUMENTS-REULTS OF THE URUGUAY ROUND
Vol. 1 (1994), 33 I.L.M. 1125 (1994) [hereinafter WTO Agreements] incorporate numerous pro-
visions based on the principle of special and differential treatment, well-summarized in
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TRADE UNIT, SPECIAL AND DIFFERENTIAL TREATMENT IN
INTERNATIONAL TRADE 7-18 (1996) [hereinafter OAS Report on Special and Differential
Treatment]; see also Catherine Curtiss & Kathryn C. Atkinson, United States-Latin American
Trade Laws, 21 N.C. I. INT'L L. & COM. REG. 111, 119-20 (1995).
35. Contemporary FTAs and other regional integration agreements, although premised on reciprocal
trade liberalization, also often include market protection mechanisms, in that smaller economies
are either permitted to undertake lower liberalization burdens, or are granted an extended transi-
tion period in which to implement mutual liberalization commitments. See OAS Report on
Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 34, at 19-56 (summarizing incorporation of spe-
cial and differential treatment in western hemisphere regional trade agreements).
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tions,36 different levels of liberalization commitments, 37 longer periods for implement-
ing liberalization obligations, 38 expanded application of the infant industry excep-
tion,3 9 and exceptions permitting broad application of quantitative restrictions. 40
Preferential access to developed country markets is the second broad component of the
principle of special and differential treatment. Trade preferences can be accorded in a vari-
ety of ways, including unilateral preference programs,4 1 treaty-based preference agree-
ments,42 and preferential mechanisms built into free trade agreements. By far, the most
well-known unilateral preference program is the Generalized System of Preferences, estab-
lished under the auspices and oversight of the GATT/WTO, 43 but implemented at the state
level.44 Other unilateral preference programs include the United States Caribbean Basin
36. Article XXXVI.8 of the GATT, added when Part IV was appended to the GATT in response to
developing country initiatives in the mid 1960s, incorporates the principle of non-reciprocity of
tariff commitments. GATT, supra note 8. It clearly recognizes that developed countries do not
expect reciprocity of their tariff/NTB reduction commitments to developing countries. Id.
37. The WTO Agreement on Agriculture, for example, envisages less severe cuts in subsidy levels by
developing states and does not require cuts by the least developed countries. WTO Agreements,
supra note 34, at annex IA.
38. In the NAFTA, for example, although there is no express differentiation of Parties according to
levels of development and although liberalization is premised on reciprocity of obligations, it can
be said overall that as a result of the negotiation process Mexico was granted longer time periods
for implementing its liberalization commitments over more sectors and with regard to more
products. North American Free Trade Agreement, Dec. 17, 1992, 32 I.L.M. 605 (1993) [here-
inafter NAFTA].
39. Under GATT Article XVIII, developing countries meeting the criteria set out in the article can
take advantage of a number of market protection mechanisms. GATT, supra note 8. Part A of
Article XVIII permits developing countries to negotiate an increase in bound tariff rates in order
to protect an infant industry. Id.
40. Developing countries were also granted an exception from the general prohibition in GATT
Article XI against quantitative restrictions. Id. Under Part B of Article XVIII, qualifying develop-
ing countries are permitted to more liberally employ quantitative restrictions in cases of balance
of payments difficulties. Id.
41. These programs are unilateral in that they are not based on mutual treaty obligations but on the
largesse of the country offering the trade preference, which generally takes the form of mutual
negotiations enacted through a statute of the country offering the benefit. They are preference
programs, not free trade programs, because they generally offer duty-free, or reduced duty, treat-
ment to only a subset of a beneficiary's exports, and these concessions are usually not reciprocal.
42. Unilateral preference agreements are essentially unilateral preferences, which are the subject of a
bilateral treaty rather than a unilateral program; therefore, they are more stable and conducive to
long-term investment in that they are not as easily canceled by the granting state as unilateral
programs are. In this hemisphere, the United States has generally followed a policy emphasizing
unilateral programs over mutually binding commitments. James R. Holbein & Gary Carpentier,
Trade Agreements and Dispute Settlement Mechanisms in the Western Hemisphere, 25 CASE W. RES.
J. INT'L L. 531, 565 (1993).
43. See generally Onyejekwe, supra note 4, at 446-67; Kofele-Kale, supra note 9, at 299-304.
44. The U.S. Generalized System of Preferences, Title V of the Trade Act of 1974 (codified as amend-
ed at 19 U.S.C. §,2461 (1998)), provides the Executive branch with discretion to award duty-free
treatment to certain developing country exports that meet program criteria. See U.S. Int'l Trade
Comm'n, Pub. No. 2894, The Year in Trade: Operation of the Trade Agreements Program, 1994, at
126 (1995).
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Initiative (CBI) and the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA), 45 and Canada's
CARIBCAN. 46 Treaty-based preference agreements include the Latin American Integration
Association (LAIA), 47 which establishes a basic framework of regional concessions and the
infrastructure for negotiation of FTAs among its members, 48 and CARICOM's preference
agreements with Venezuela 49 and with Colombia. 50 Finally, the preferential access compo-
nent of the principle of special and differential treatment can also be recognized to a limited
45. Together the ATPA and CBI programs provide the best access into the U.S. market short of
NAFTA membership. In 1994, 18.3 percent of total CBI imports and 11.6 percent of total ATPA
imports enjoyed duty-free treatment under their respective programs, as compared to 3 percent
of all U.S. imports under the GSP program. Id. at 126-29, tables 5-2, 5-4, 5-5. Treatment under
the CBI and ATPA programs is more favorable because more products qualify for preferential
treatment than under the GSP program, and these programs do not contain "competitive needs"
exclusions, provisions found in the GSP statute for excluding certain goods on the basis of the
competitiveness of the product or country of origin. See JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 1131 (1995). Although the CBI and ATPA may lack com-
petitive needs exclusions, many of their most competitive products are automatically ineligible
for preferential treatment.
46. As with the U.S. CBI program, the CARIBCAN program eliminates duties on all beneficiary
products except the most competitive, including leather goods, textiles and apparel, and footwear.
ORGANIZATION OF AMERICAN STATES TRADE UNIT, TOWARD FREE TRADE IN THE AMERICAS 29 (June
1995) [hereinafter Toward Free Trade]. Excluded goods are eligible for reduced tariff rates under
Canada's GSP-equivalent. Id.
47. Members include Argentina, Brazil, Chile, Mexico, Paraguay, Peru, and Uruguay, plus Colombia,
Ecuador, Venezuela, and Bolivia. LAIA, formed in 1980 to succeed the LAFTA as the "umbrella"
association for Latin American integration, was designed to foster the regional development and
creation of a Latin American customs union, but LAIA does not itself seek to become a FTA or
CU. Loren S. Weisenfeld, Introduction to Treaty of Montevideo Establishing the LAIA, in BASIC
DOCUMENTS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 543 (Stephen Zamora & Ronald A. Brand eds.,
1990); GARY CLYDE HUFBAUER & JEFFREY SCHOTT, WESTERN HEMISPHERE ECONOMIC INTEGRATION
270 (1994).
48. LAIA establishes three types of tariff concessions among its members: an across-the-board
regional tariff preference scheme giving percentage reductions in national tariffs, graduated by
the grantor and grantee's level of development; special non-reciprocal preferences for LDCs; and
the negotiation of special concession agreements, limited preferences granted to another country
or set of countries. G. POPE ATKINS, LATIN AMERICA IN THE INTERNATIONAL POLITICAL SYSTEM 188
(3d ed. 1995); Kenneth Abbott & Gregory W. Bowman, Economic Integration in the Americas: 'A
Work in Progress," 14 Nw. J. INT'L L. & Bus. 493, 497-98 (1994). These arrangements are support-
ed by "complementation agreements," creating sectoral free trade to benefit intra-industry spe-
cialization within regions and a special intra-regional import credit arrangement to reduce need
for foreign capital in intra-regional trade. See generally Daniel M. Ferrere, New Trends in Latin
American Foreign Trade: The LAIA and Its Work, 19 INT'L LAW. 933 (1985).
49. See Toward Free Trade, supra note 46, at 29. After five years the parties will begin negotiations to
make the agreement reciprocal, at which point it will become a FTA. The Agreement with
Venezuela, signed October, 1992, provides duty-free access for some CARICOM exports into
Venezuela.
50. The Agreement with Colombia, signed in July, 1994, provides immediate duty-free treatment for
eighty-six percent of Colombia's CARICOM imports. See id. The percentage will increase to
ninety by January, 1998. See id. The parties will negotiate over further preferences and reciprocal
concessions from the largest Caribbean countries. See id.
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extent in free trade agreements despite the fact that such agreements envision some form of
preferential access to all members of the integration scheme.5 '
2. Assistance Programs.
Economic assistance in the form of direct development aid, indirect development
aid, facilitation of private investment flows, and the provision of technical assistance, is
the second critical component in strategies to deal with adjustment and asymmetry prob-
lems in unequal partner trade. In the face of significant adjustment problems, one often
finds some combination of direct financial assistance, facilitation of private investment
and technology transfers, and technical assistance programs, supported by the positive
transition delays effected by special and differential treatment.
Economic assistance programs can involve both direct and indirect wealth transfers.
Direct wealth transfers typically involve intergovernmental grants, while indirect wealth
transfers can involve funds transferred to, and disbursed by, a regional development
bank.52 Indirect wealth transfers can also be accomplished through the facilitation of pri-
vate transfers in the form of foreign direct and portfolio investment. Finally, assistance
programs can also focus on the provision of technical assistance and financial support for
technical assistance, rather than on monetary transfers.
III. The FTAA and the Problem of Inequality.
By any measure, this hemisphere contains a large preponderance of small economies. 53
In terms of population, of the thirty-four summit countries,54 nine account for nearly nine-
51. For smaller economies that become members, access is of course preferential in comparison to
non-members. Even in the case of non-members that are beneficiaries of unilateral preference
programs, the treatment of smaller economy members is still preferential, in that it will usually
grant even better treatment across a wider spectrum of exports and, most importantly, will be in
the form of a binding treaty obligation and not a discretionary program. With respect to the
other members, treatment is still preferential in that, despite the general expectation of mutuality
in trade liberalization, the smaller economy member will often be granted longer periods in
which to implement equivalent levels of liberalization obligations.
52. See generally ANNE 0. KRUEGER, ECONOMIC POLICIES AT CROSS PURPOSES: THE UNITED STATES AND
DEVELOPING COUNTRIES 64-67 (1993) (surveying definitional problems in assessing foreign aid)
(reviewed in 27 GEo. WASH. J. INT'L L. & ECON. 288).
53. The Working Group has taken the position that self-selection is the appropriate principle to fol-
low in identifying smaller economies in the Summit process. This is consistent with the approach
taken in the GATT/WTO system, in which countries are allowed to self-select their own appro-
priate development status, with LDC status available only to countries with a per capita income
of under 1000 U.S. dollars. Bernal, supra note 21, at 3. Nevertheless, in its analysis of the status of
smaller economies, the Working Group did identify population, land size, and GDP as rough
indicators of an economy's human, land, and capital resources. Interim Report on Smaller
Economies, supra note 24, at 3.
54. Summit countries include Antigua & Barbuda, Argentina, Barbados, Bahamas, Brazil, Bolivia,
Belize, Costa Rica, Canada, Colombia, Chile, Dominia, Dominican Republic, El Salvador,
Ecuador, Guyana, Grenada, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, St. Kitts & Nevis, St. Vincent & the Grenadines, St. Lucia, Suriname, Trinidad &
Tobagor, Uruguay, the United States, and Venezuela. See Bernal, supra note 21, at 18.
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ty percent of the hemisphere's population. 55 In terms of land area, the five largest countries
account for over eighty-two percent of the hemisphere's land territory, and the ten largest
account for over ninety-five percent.56 In terms of GDP, the two largest countries together
account for a whopping eighty-five percent of the hemisphere's GDP.57
Moreover, the disparity in size is remarkable. The largest population is over 6,000
times larger than the smallest population. 58 The state with the largest territory, Canada, is
over 30,000 times larger than the aggregate of the fifteen smallest.59 The largest economy,
that of the United States, is ten times larger than the next largest economy, Canada, and is
over 850 times larger than the aggregate GDP of the ten smallest countries. 60
Together these three indicators paint a relatively consistent picture: within this hemi-
sphere countries that are small in population and land size are generally also small in
terms of GDP. Moreover, the relative disparities in all three indicators between the greater
and the lesser economies are pronounced. When one considers the unique risks smaller
economies face in trade, discussed above, this adds up to a significant problem for FTAA
negotiators with profound implications for trade and integration in this hemisphere.
The challenge of creating a hemispheric integration system in the face of the dispari-
ties among the hemisphere's countries was recognized by Summit participants. The
Declaration of Principles highlights the complex and unprecedented nature of the under-
taking "particularly in view of the wide differences in the levels of development and the
size of the economies existing in our hemisphere."6 1 The Plan of Action commits Summit
participants to "facilitate the integration of the smaller economies and increase their level
of development.
'62
A. THE WORKING GROUP ON SMALLER ECONOMIES.
The Working Group was formed at the Denver Ministerial in June, 1995, and charged
at the Cartagena Ministerial of March, 1996, with the responsibility of identifying and
assessing the factors affecting the participation of smaller economies in the FTAA and in
the expansion of trade and investment expected throughout the hemisphere as a result.
The principal elements of the work program of the Working Group involved the prepara-
tion and adoption of several studies and reports, in which it was assisted by the OAS
Special Trade Unit, the IADB, and the UN ECLAC.
First, the Working Group was commissioned to prepare a comparative evaluation of
the treatment of smaller economies in international and regional integration systems.
55. The United States, Brazil, Mexico, Colombia, Argentina, Canada, Peru, Venezuela, and Chile. See
id.
56. The five largest are Canada, the United States, Brazil, Argentina, and Mexico. To those are added
Peru, Colombia, Bolivia, Venezuela, and Chile to make the ten largest in terms of land mass. See
id.
57. The United States and Canada. See id. at 19 (citing World Bank and IADB data in 1990 U.S. dol-
lars normalized for exchange rate fluctuations).
58. The United States had 263 million inhabitants to the 40,000 of St. Kitts & Nevis. See id. at 18 (cit-
ing 1995 data).
59. See id. (table).
60. Id. (table).
61. Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, supra note 17, at 812.
62. Id.
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This was carried out by the OAS in its report entitled "Special and Differential Treatment
in International Trade."6 3 Second, the Working Group was to identify the characteristics
of smaller economies that could affect effective FTAA participation. This analysis was also
supported by the OAS, and reported in its "Observations on Small Economies and
Western Hemisphere Economic Integration."64 Third, the Working Group was to evaluate
the effect of an economy's size on trade liberalization and economic growth. This was
carried out by the staff of the World Bank and published in its report "Small Economies:
Trade Liberalization, Trade Preferences and Growth."65 Fourth, the Working Group was
to identify specific problems faced by smaller economies that might affect their integra-
tion into the FTAA, such as technical barriers to trade, lack of transparency, inadequate
resources, lack of infrastructure and transport, trade tax dependence, external debt, and
smaller enterprises. This aspect of the Working Group work program was supported by
the UN ECLAC, which promulgated its findings in two reports: "Factors Affecting the
Participation of Caribbean Countries in the FTAA" and "Characteristics of the Central
American Countries and the Dominican Republic That Could Affect Their Participation
in the FTAA."66 Fifth, the Working Group was to examine domestic opportunities to
facilitate the integration of smaller economies and increase their level of development,
such as internal adjustments, which ECLAC reported on in "Internal Policy Measures to
Facilitate the Integration of SEs into the FTAA" 67 and mechanisms and measures in the
integration process itself, such as the pace of the process, reported on by the OAS in
"Mechanisms and Measures to Facilitate the Participation of SEs in the FTAA." 68 The
Working Group was also to evaluate the particular technical assistance requirements of
smaller economies, which appear in a report by the SELA, "Profile of Technical
Cooperation Programme for Small Economies." 69 Finally, the Working Group examined
the need for, and feasibility of, a regional integration fund, as set forth in a paper pre-
pared for the Working Group by ECLAC.70
Together these reports constitute a rich literature and database on the opportunities
and challenges for integration of smaller economies into the FTAA and represent an
important achievement of the Working Group. It is reasonable to expect that out of these
studies will come the concrete policy proposals affecting smaller economy integration to
be formulated throughout the FTAA Negotiation Groups. In the meantime, the Working
Group itself developed a series of recommendations for structuring the FTAA negotiation
process in view of smaller economy concerns, and it is to this aspect of the Working
Group's work program that this article now turns.
63. OAS Report on Special and Differential Treatment, supra note 34.
64. OAS Report on Small Economies, supra note 21.
65. World Bank, Small Economies: Trade Liberalization, Trade Preferences and Growth, 12/1/95,
cited in Bernal, supra note 21, at 11 n.36.
66. Id. at 11 n.37.
67. Id. at I In.38.
68. OAS Trade Unit Studies, March 1998.
69. Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 24, at 18 n.1.
70. A Regional Integration Fund of the Free Trade Area of the Americas, U.N. Economic Commission
for Latin American Countries, U.N. Doc. LC/R.1738 (1998) (hereinafter Regional Integration
Fund Report].
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B. THE WORKING GROUP'S WORK PRODUCT.
The Working Group's interim and final reports adopt the various reports and studies
mentioned above and incorporate their findings, together with the deliberations of the
Working Group, 7' into an overall program to facilitate the integration of smaller
economies into the FTAA. This program consists of three principal elements: (I) recom-
mendations concerning the negotiation of the FTAA; (2) recommendations involving the
limited incorporation of the principle of special and differential treatment to address
smaller economy asymmetry concerns through FTAA provisions; and (3) recommenda-
tions strongly endorsing the adjustment needs of smaller economies with regard to tech-
nical assistance, but giving weak to no support for financial assistance addressing other
aspects of the smaller economy adjustment problem. Several key elements of this pro-
gram were incorporated into the San Jose Ministerial Declaration arising from the Costa
Rican Ministerial, and to a lesser extent the Santiago Declaration of the Santiago Summit,
and thereby into the negotiating structure and objectives of the FTAA.
1. Rio Interim Report.
The Interim Report delivered to the hemisphere's trade vice-ministers at the Rio
vice-ministerial meeting contains a variety of findings and policy recommendations con-
cerning the place of smaller economies in the FTAA process. The Interim Report begins
with a brief analysis of the characteristics of smaller economies, focusing on population
size, land mass, and GDP per capita. 72 Employing these characteristics, the Interim
Report finds that as many as twenty-four hemispheric countries manifest one or more of
these characteristics. 73 Given the nature and extent of the factors adversely affecting the
participation of smaller economies in international trade, the conclusion is that a signifi-
cant number of the Summit countries face an extensive array of hurdles in successfully
participating in the FTAA.
The Interim Report goes on to address these hurdles through a series of recommend-
ed measures to be adopted in the negotiation and implementation of the FTAA. In terms
of negotiation the key recommendations are, first, that smaller economies be able to
negotiate as a group in order to pool scarce human and material resources 74 and second,
that the need for special assistance on the part of smaller economies with respect to issues
under negotiation be formally recognized and continue to be served by the Tripartite
Committee (OAS, IADB, ECLCAC) or some other appropriate FTAA mechanism. 75
71. The Working Group met eight times between August 1995 and September 1997 under the chair-
manship of Jamaica and the leadership of the Hon. Dr. Richard Bernal, Ambassador of Jamaica to
the United States, a long-time student of smaller economy integration. See, e.g., Richard Bernal,
Regional Trade Arrangements in the Western Hemisphere, 8 AM. U. J. INT'L L. & POL'Y 683 (1993).
72. These characteristics are discussed in further detail in Bernal, supra note 21.
73. Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 24, at 18, para. 1.
74. This recommendation does not appear to have been directly addressed in any of the ministerial
declarations although provision is made for group negotiation by members of regional integra-
tion units. It may be that such participation by regional groupings containing a preponderance of
smaller economies, such as CACM and CARICOM, would accomplish much of the same pur-
pose. Alternatively, it may be that the hemisphere's smaller economies should form a "G-24" for
consultation or negotiation as a group.
75. See infra note 90 and accompanying text (regarding disposition of this issue).
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The balance of the Interim Report consists, broadly speaking, of two types of recom-
mendations: measures to enable smaller economies to take full advantage of the FTAA's
economic opportunities; and measures to facilitate the participation of smaller
economies in the FTAA negotiation process and treaty regime. 76 It is within this portion
of the Interim Report that one finds limited endorsement of the principles of special and
differential treatment and adjustment assistance.
Steps enabling full utilization of FTAA economic opportunities include the imple-
mentation by smaller economies of appropriate internal legal and policy adjustments as
early as possible; 77 however, the primary focus of the Interim Report is on recognition of
the broad systemic need on the part of smaller economies for technical assistance in the
implementation of such adjustments, and at all stages of the formulation and implemen-
tation of FTAA norms. 78 As a response, the Working Group recommends an obligation
on the part of other FTAA countries to provide such assistance as they can and to include
the need for such assistance in the work program of each FTAA negotiating group.79
In order to facilitate the participation of smaller economies in the FTAA negotiations
and the appropriate regard for smaller economy needs in the resulting FTAA treaty, the
Working Group recommends the inclusion of specific asymmetry and adjustment issues
in the agenda of each Negotiation Group and specific asymmetry and adjustment mea-
sures throughout relevant provisions of the FTAA. Suggested provisions include the fol-
lowing: technical assistance in areas such as intellectual property and technical standards;
simple and transparent rules of origin and customs documents; longer implementation
periods for trade liberalization commitments; the possibility of implementation of cer-
tain obligations, such as technical standards, at regional or subregional levels to save
resources; and a general effort to reduce 'transition costs and minimize internal disloca-
tion in smaller economies.
2. The Final Report.
The Working Group's Final Report to the trade ministers of the Summit countries
was adopted at the eighth and final meeting of the Working Group in Mexico City in
mid-October, 1997.80 This report does not focus as directly on the asymmetry and
adjustment issues treated in the Interim Report, but rather on recommendations for the
76. This distinction, found in the Interim Report, is not always clear in its application.
77. Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 24, para. 7.
78. In particular, proposals for negotiation and construction of the FTAA should take into account
the need of smaller economies for technical assistance and cooperation on developing appropri-
ate legislation, strengthening national institutions/agencies, human resource training, and public
workshops on WTO and FTAA issues and on intellectual property and technical standards issues.
Id. para. 9.
79. Id. paras. 7-9.
80. Summary of the Eighth Meeting of the Working Group on Smaller Economies, Oct. 14-16, 1997,
reprinted in 4 AM. TRADE, Oct. 30, 1997, at 5-6 [hereinafter Final Report on Smaller Economies].
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negotiation process.8 ' The adjustment issue was raised quite directly, however, during
consideration of a World Bank report on the Regional Integration Fund, which analyzed
the need for funding sources for technical assistance and technical assistance-related
adjustment measures. 82 The Regional Integration Fund Report appears to have engen-
dered some controversy, and the Working Group referred the matter to the vice-minister-
ial level for further work on the technical and "political" levels.8 3
The balance of the Final Report concerns objectives and principles to guide the negotia-
tions. The Report recounts several "Principles to Guide Negotiations:' drawn from the
Miami Declaration and other Summit documents. Together these principles call for negoti-
ating groups that operate in a transparent manner on a consensus principle and aim at a
WTO-consistent single-undertaking approach to negotiation that should be open to partici-
pation by all thirty-four countries either individually or in regional groups. 84 In particular,
the Final Report calls for "special attention.., to the needs, economic conditions and oppor-
tunities of the smaller economies to ensure their full participation in the FTAA process "' 85
The Final Report also suggests several forms in which this "special attention" could
take shape in the approach to negotiating the FTAA. The principle recommendation is
that the Summit countries form a Consultative Group on Smaller Economies (the
"Consultative Group"), as a forum for participation by smaller economies in many
aspects of the negotiation and as an oversight body with regard to smaller economy con-
cerns in the negotiations as a whole. This approach must be understood in connection
with the second recommendation, that smaller economy issues be incorporated into the
mandate of the Trade Negotiations Committee created to take overall responsibility for
the negotiation process. Thus the concerns of smaller economies would be part of the
responsibility of the main body charged with conduct and oversight of the negotiation
process, and there would be a special consultative body for developing smaller economy
policies and positions, channeling these to the Trade Negotiations Committee and moni-
toring the negotiations for issues of smaller economy concern.86
81. The first part of the Final Report on Smaller Economies consists of the reception and debate of
several of the reports commissioned by the Working Group, including reports by the panel of
independent experts on Overcoming Obstacles and Maximizing Opportunities and the OAS
report on Mechanisms and Measures to Facilitate Participation of Smaller Economies in FTAA,
together with a review of various other OAS, IDB and SELA activities related to technical assis-
tance. In the first part of the report the Working Group also adopted a position on the issue of def-
initions of smaller economies, opting for self-identification in lieu of a controlling definition. Id.
82. Regional Integration Fund Report, supra note 70. The report does not treat in detail a mecha-
nism for development assistance outside of the technical assistance area, arguing that such aid
should be funneled through established financial institutions. Id. at 7.
83. Final Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 80, paras. 6-10. Reference for further work at "an
appropriate political level" reflects the controversy over direct aid programs, even where such aid
is clearly tied to technical assistance.
84. Id. pt. II.ii.
85. Id. pt. II.ii.(7).
86. Not surprisingly, the Working Group concluded that the recommendation of specific mecha-
nisms was premature and involved the resolution of political questions; further elaboration was
referred to the vice ministerial level in connection with future FTAA structural decisions.
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3. Summary.
The Working Group's programmatic recommendations thus incorporate, albeit on a
limited basis, the principles of special and differential treatment and adjustment assis-
tance as key components of a program to address the asymmetry and adjustment con-
cerns of smaller economies participating in the FTAA process.
The Interim Report adopts the principle of special and differential treatment, but
with regard to longer implementation periods and not to different levels of obligation.
This is consistent with the trend in the NAFTA and other contemporary North-South
integration schemes towards reciprocity of obligations.87
The Interim Report also recognizes the adjustment difficulties faced by smaller
economies, but in a more ambiguous manner. Although the Interim Report sounds a
clear call for broad, systemic technical assistance, the Final Report leaves unresolved the
critical issue of a Regional Integration Fund, a key element of North-South integration.
Finally, on a structural level the Final Report recommends the incorporation of
smaller economy concerns as part of the charge of the Trade Negotiations Committee,
and the formation of the Consultative Group as a forum for smaller economy participa-
tion, formulation of a common position, and as an institutionalized form of input into
the Trade Negotiations Committee and the negotiating groups in general.
C. WORKING GROUP RECOMMENDATIONS INCORPORATED INTO
THE FTAA NEGOTIATIONS.
1. Costa Rica.
At the Costa Rica Ministerial, Summit country trade ministers adopted the Working
Group's two principal recommendations. Smaller economy issues were specifically incor-
porated into the agenda for the Trade Negotiations Committee structure adopted at that
ministerial,8 8 and the ministers agreed to the formation of the Consultative Group. 89
The Working Group was successful in addressing several key asymmetry concerns
through incorporation of critical elements of the special and differential treatment prin-
ciple into the negotiating objectives of key negotiating groups. For example, in the objec-
tives for the Market Access Group, the market protection element of special and differen-
tial treatment is recognized in the provision for negotiation of different trade liberaliza-
tion timetables. Moreover, the facilitation of smaller economy integration and full partici-
pation in negotiation are specifically listed as objectives. 90
In the area of services, the objectives of the Services Group are silent on the issue of
special and differential treatment, no doubt because of the acute sensitivity of this sector
for developed country services exporters, and smaller economies concerned over the loss
of any nascent services industry. Nevertheless, the stated objectives for this group do at
least include that the Group ensure the integration of smaller economies into the FTAA
87. See supra text accompanying notes 35 and 38.
88. Costa Rican Ministerial Declaration, supra note 20, para. 10.
89. Id. para. 13.
90. Costa Rican Ministerial Declaration, supra note 20, at annex II.
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process. 9 1 The possibility is left open for some sort of non-reciprocity in the levels of ser-
vices sector liberalization commitments as in the NAFTA. 92
Finally, the objectives for the Negotiating Group on Agriculture incorporate by refer-
ence those of the Market Access Group, thus including the key market protection princi-
ple of differential implementation periods in this area of critical concern to smaller
economies. 9 3 Moreover, the objectives for the Agriculture Group specifically cite the
importance of ensuring the nondiscriminatory application of sanitary and phytosanitary
measures in accordance with the WTO SPS Agreement, an important market access issue
for smaller economies in view of the fact that SPS measures are often applied as non-tariff
barriers against their agricultural exports. 9 4
The Working Group had limited success in incorporating the technical assistance
aspect of the adjustment issue into the FTAA negotiation process. Although technical
assistance needs were not addressed directly in any of the general provisions of the San
Jose Declaration or the specific negotiating objectives listed for the Negotiating Groups,
the San Jose Declaration does affirm that the Negotiating Groups shall be guided by the
general principles and objectives for negotiation of the FTAA listed in Annex I to the
Declaration, which include the call for systemic inclusion of technical assistance needs in
the work of all negotiating groups.95 The Working Group also succeeded in securing con-
tinued technical assistance from Tripartite Committee organs, as requested in the Rio
Progress Report, which had been the subject of some controversy.96
The one glaring omission from the San Jose Declaration is any mention of a Regional
Integration Fund, as debated by the Working Group. It appears likely that, as the issue was
referred to the vice-ministerial level for further work "at an appropriate political level "' 97
such work had simply not advanced to the consensus stage in time for inclusion in the
San Jose Declaration. Moreover, there is no mention of a negotiating group or special
committee to focus on the formation of such a fund.
2. Santiago Summit.
The Santiago Summit added little to the program established by the San Jose
Declaration in the way of substance regarding the concerns of the smaller economies. The
key accomplishment is the inclusion of language highlighting the situation of the hemi-
sphere's "most vulnerable countries" throughout the negotiation process.
91. Id.
92. For the patchy web of services commitments negotiated under the NAFTA services chapter see
NAFTA, supra note 38, at chs. 12, 14 and related annexes.
93. Costa Rican Ministerial Declaration, supra note 20, at annex II.
94. Id.
95. Id. at annex I, General Principle (h)(i).
96. Interim Report on Smaller Economies, supra note 24, at 17.
97. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
238 NAFTA: Law and Business Review of the Americas
IV. Conclusion.
The main accomplishment of the Working Group consists of its success in ensuring
that smaller economy issues remain on the radar screen throughout the FTAA negotia-
tion process. This has been achieved through incorporation of smaller economy concerns
into the Trade Negotiations Committee agenda and the formation of the Consultative
Group, as set out in the San Jose Declaration. Substantively, the Working Group attained
limited success in addressing the asymmetry and adjustment concerns of smaller
economies through incorporation of these concerns in the negotiation objectives of the
Negotiating Groups. Asymmetry problems are addressed principally through recognition
that different timetables for implementation of liberalization commitments is an appro-
priate mechanism for integration among the hemisphere's unequal partners, thus incor-
porating a key element of the special and differential treatment principle. Beyond this,
however, there is little mention of market protection mechanisms, except for the possibil-
ity that in the services sector non-reciprocity will be observed as it was in the NAFTA.
Likewise, there is little mention of the market access needs of smaller economies beyond
the general objective of smaller economy integration, except for the mention of elimina-
tion of the use of sanitary and phytosanitary measures as non-tariff barriers against
smaller economy agricultural exports.
In terms of the adjustment needs of smaller economies, the need for technical assis-
tance has clearly been recognized, even if it received scant attention in the main text of
the San Jose Declaration. There is no agreement, however, on the necessity for a financial
assistance component or even on the financial assistance necessary to support technical
assistance measures, and there is no provision made for the formal negotiation of such a
mechanism. 98
In addition to the incorporation of these substantive points in the San Jose
Declaration, the work of the Working Group remains a vital resource for the formulation
by the Consultative Group of substantive policy recommendations to be incorporated by
the Trade Negotiations Committee. In this regard, the Working Group's sponsorship and
adoption of the many OAS, World Bank, ECLAC, and SELA studies and reports will be
particularly useful.
The ultimate success of the Working Group must await the elaboration of specific
substantive commitments incorporating Working Group proposals at the Negotiating
Group level, which will depend in part on the effectiveness of the Consultative Group. It
is critical for the Consultative Group to stay actively involved in all negotiation groups in
which key smaller economy issues will be raised, such as market access (ensuring differen-
tial treatment and access for key exports such as agricultural products and competitive
manufactured goods), investment (adequate prudential safeguards), and services (differ-
ential treatment in services liberalization). 99
98. Presumably the final investment and intellectual property provisions of the FTAA will reflect the
NAFTA approach and will facilitate private movement of capital and technology, but it is unlikely
that private capital will be adequate or appropriate to meet all assistance needs.
99. The Consultative Group's initial work program, which is unfortunately very general in nature,
can be found in Americas Trade-Special Report, July 1, 1998, at 5-6.
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In particular, the Consultative Group must focus on the implementation of a
Regional Integration Fund. As noted, this is not part of the agenda of any specific negoti-
ating group, 100 and to date the issue has not been raised at the negotiating level by any
Summit state.10 1 Nevertheless, there is reason to hope that the issue will resurface at an
appropriate point, as at least the CARICOM states remain committed to fuller discussion
of the needs and principles underlying such a fund, even if the resulting mechanism is
not in formal terms a regional integration fund. 102
It is to be hoped that the issue of a regional integration fund receives serious attention
from the hemisphere's larger more developed economies, as some form of development
assistance would be powerful "glue" for the FTAA process, both symbolically and realistical-
ly.'0 3 Significant North-South public-wealth transfers are not politically popular in the
North, and hence are not likely to play a large role in easing the process of FTAA integration
across development inequalities. 104 Nevertheless, the need for financial assistance as part of
economic integration between countries of unequal development will not go away simply
because the political will for significant wealth transfers is absent in the North. 105
100. See supra note 24 and accompanying text.
101. Letter from the Hon. Dr. Richard L. Bernal to Prof. Frank J. Garcia (Mar. 2, 1999) (on file with
author).
102. Id.
103. Existing levels of public assistance through the Inter-American Development Bank and World
Bank total only approximately one percent of the region's GDP on an annual basis. HUFBAUER &
ScHor, supra note 47, at 67.
104. See id. at 16 (U.S. budget deficit and domestic spending obligations precluded large scale finan-
cial assistance to Latin America as part of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative, which is the
policy "grandparent" of the FTAA). See also Declaration of Principles and Plan of Action, supra
note 17 (Summit countries endorse trade and investment over public aid).
105. See Helen E. Hartnell, Association Agreements Between the EC and Central and Eastern
European States, Address Before the First European Regional Conference 10 (Oct. 3, 1993) (on
file with author) (financial assistance from the EC continues to be an important priority for
Central and Eastern European associated states).
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